M52HNexO 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 NEXSTAR MEDIA INC., Plaintiff, 4 5 21 Civ. 6860 (JGK) V. 6 COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 7 Defendant. 8 Telephone Conference 9 New York, N.Y. May 2, 2022 11:05 a.m. 10 Before: 11 12 HON. JOHN G. KOELTL, 13 District Judge 14 APPEARANCES COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (Los Angeles) 15 Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: MITCHELL A. KAMIN 16 17 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL Attorneys for Defendant 18 BY: DANA MEREDITH SESHENS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

M52HNex0

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1 (The Court and all parties present remotely) 2 THE LAW CLERK: The case is Nexstar Media 3 Inc. v. Comcast Cable Communications LLC, case No. 21 Civ. 6860. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Who's on the line for the 6 plaintiff? 7 MR. KAMIN: Good morning, your Honor. This is Mitch Kamin from Covington and Burling, for Nexstar Media. 8 9 THE COURT: And who's on the line for the defendant 10 Comcast? MS. SESHENS: Good morning, your Honor. 11 This is Dana Seshens, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, for the defendant Comcast 12 13 Cable Communications LLC. 14 THE COURT: All right. This is a motion to dismiss or 15 stay by the defendant. I'm familiar with the papers. 16 Perfectly prepared to listen to anything that the parties would 17 like to tell me. Ms. Seshens. 18 19 Thank you, your Honor. May it MS. SESHENS: Yes. 20 please the Court, Dana Seshens, for the defendant, Comcast 21 Cable Communications. 22 This case, in our view, your Honor, is exactly the 23 type of case to which we think the primary jurisdiction 24 doctrine should apply, and in fact, the case for application of

that doctrine has only become stronger since briefing on

Comcast's motion was complete.

As your Honor undoubtedly has seen in the record since the time that briefing was completed, the FCC has notified Comcast in writing that its petition, which was administratively converted to an informal complaint, is under review by the Media Bureau right now. Also since that time, another cable operator, Spectrum, owned by Charter has filed with the FCC a second informal complaint against Nexstar that is substantively identical to Comcast's complaint, raising similar issues based upon the same underlying conduct. And we would submit, your Honor, that the technical and policy issues presented in this case satisfy all of -- I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: Can I stop you just there.

MS. SESHENS: Of course.

THE COURT: The complaint by Comcast with the FCC is a violation of the ownership regulations, right?

MS. SESHENS: Among other things, but, yes, that is one of the contentions in the complaint.

THE COURT: But there's no allegation in the complaint of a violation of the negotiation regulations?

MS. SESHENS: That is correct, your Honor. There's no specific reference to the negotiation regulation. I think part and parcel of the allegations in the FCC complaint is that Nexstar's conduct has violated, at least in Comcast's view, any number of FCC rules and orders, the Nexstar/Tribune order being

M52HNex0

one that's identified, but the FCC would have the discretion to go beyond the rules that are identified.

But to directly answer your question, the specific negotiation rule or regulation is not identified in the Comcast FCC complaint.

THE COURT: So why should I wait for the FCC to decide the current complaint that doesn't directly raise the issue of a violation of the negotiation regulations? Doesn't the contract issue that's before me raise simply the question of whether the negotiation violates any FCC negotiation regulation?

MS. SESHENS: Well, respectfully, your Honor, I think the contract issue --

THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on one second.

MS. SESHENS: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Please try to scrub "respectfully" from your vocabulary when you talk to me. I assume that unless lawyers give me reason to doubt it that what they say to me is respectfully and with all due respect. And oftentimes "respectfully" is simply an effort by lawyers to tell the Court that even though what may follow may otherwise be subject to contempt, don't take it that way, Judge, because I said "with all due respect."

MS. SESHENS: I appreciate that admonition, your Honor, and I'd like to think my next remarks would not be

M52HNexO

subject to contempt, but, rather, would reflect reasonable disagreement perhaps with the proposition that the Court has offered.

And what I would say, your Honor, is that the contract issue before the Court is actually broader than whether there is any violation of the negotiation rule as Nexstar has identified it, and the express language of the contract requires a determination of whether Nexstar has the right to negotiate retransmission consent for WPIX under the "FCC's rules." And the rules referenced are plural, and rules is defined in the contract broadly to include the rules and regulations and orders essentially of the FCC. So there is no limitation in the contract to a particular rule or regulation, and certainly none to the negotiation rule itself.

So from our perspective, your Honor, the reason to wait for the FCC is because the questions posed by Comcast in the FCC complaint are exactly the questions this Court will have to answer in determining whether Nexstar's conduct gives it the ability to negotiate retransmission consent for WPIX under the FCC rules as broadly defined.

THE COURT: Well, that's your interpretation of the contract. There's a specific provision in the contract which defines stations and provides an inclusion for new stations if Nexstar is not prohibited from negotiating for retransmission consent on behalf of such stations under FCC rules.

Now, I don't decide anything, of course, until it's fully briefed, and the meaning of that contractual provision will plainly be the subject of dispute between the parties, but if that contract provision is eventually found to mean that — require a determination whether Nexstar is prohibited from negotiating for retransmission consent on behalf of such stations under FCC rules, one would wonder whether the correct interpretation of that contractual phrase is FCC negotiation rules as opposed to rules — any FCC rules, and one would question whether the ownership rules would be a fair reading of that provision.

I understand the argument about the broad scope of FCC rules, but one would have to ask whether the ownership rules are, for example, a prohibition on negotiating for retransmission consent, if you follow what I'm asking.

MS. SESHENS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So that would come down to a question of contract interpretation rather than an ultimate question of the meaning of the ownership rules.

MS. SESHENS: I think, your Honor, two points in response. I think, as a matter of contract interpretation, FCC's rules is actually a defined term in the contract in Section 1. And the definition to which the parties agreed says that FCC's rules means the rules, regulation, and promulgated policies of the FCC. So that could mean any number of rules,

regulations, and promulgated policies of the FCC. If the parties had intended to limit the ability to negotiate retransmission consent to the so-called negotiation rule, we would submit that the parties would have so agreed and/or would have defined FCC's rules in the plural differently.

I think, relatedly, your Honor, you will be asked, in deciding the interpretation of this provision, to conclude whether Nexstar has the ability to negotiation for this retransmission consent. We would submit that the sheer fact that the parties have differing views on which FCC rules are applicable here is an illustration of why this case is appropriate for a stay or dismissal without prejudice while the FCC considers that issue.

THE COURT: But the FCC is not considering that issue. The FCC is not considering the contractual interpretation.

MS. SESHENS: That is correct, your Honor. The question of the meaning of the retransmission consent agreement is not directly before the FCC, but what the FCC has been asked to weigh in on is whether Nexstar's conduct violates both the national ownership cap, runs contrary to the Nexstar/Tribune order, and otherwise undermines or undercuts the policies, the promulgated policies, of the FCC.

So the FCC complaint, therefore, asks the FCC to weigh in on that question in the first instance and then requests that the FCC fashion a remedy to address that conduct in the

M52HNex0

event it finds some form of a violation. And in that event the FCC, in the exercise of its discretion, which is virtually exclusive in this regard, could fashion a remedy that prohibits or restricts Nexstar's ability to negotiate retransmission consent. And that is expressly identified and set forth in the FCC complaint that is currently pending.

THE COURT: But that's highly speculative as to what the FCC would do. And the complaint in this action, and correct me if I'm wrong, seeks damages for breach of contract for fees that should have been paid and have not been paid. Is that fair?

MS. SESHENS: Yes, I think that's a fair assignment, your Honor.

THE COURT: So it would be highly speculative to say that in response to a complaint that doesn't specifically refer to the negotiation of retransmission fees for WPIX, the FCC would reach out to decide that question and, on top of that, would not decide the question on a going forward basis, but would say you're not entitled to all of these past fees. On a going forward basis, Nexstar argues there are lots of other remedies to an alleged violation of the ownership rules, including shedding stations in other markets.

Your turn.

MS. SESHENS: Yes, your Honor. That is Nexstar's argument. But I think, your Honor, from our perspective, the

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downside to deferral here or referral or staying the case is simply some delay without any prejudice to Nexstar. The case is about money damages, and the money will be available once the FCC resolves this issue, to the extent that is how the Court were to resolve the case. But on the flip side, if the Court were to proceed and make findings or determinations about the meaning of this contract provision and, for example, were to find that Nexstar has the authority to negotiate retransmission consent, but the FCC, in the exercise of its expertise and discretion, were to decide that Nexstar's conduct gave rise to the need for remedial action that would prohibit Nexstar from negotiating retransmission consent, then we have a real conflict between the FCC's rule and this Court's ruling, which could be avoided by simply staying this case or dismissing it without prejudice while the FCC proceeds.

We would again submit that Nexstar is not prejudiced by that, and it is free to return to this court or resume this case, and we would proceed accordingly once the FCC has made its determination.

THE COURT: Why does the FCC have expertise in determining the intent of the parties in entering into this particular provision of the retransmission agreement?

MS. SESHENS: So I don't think that's the expertise that the FCC brings to bear. And in fact, the interpretation of the contract provision is not, as we've noted, squarely

before the FCC. That is obviously a question that the Court is well positioned to address. The FCC, however, does have the expertise and the almost unfettered discretion to decide issues around broadcast licensing. And the Nexstar conduct that is alleged in the FCC's petition directly bears on the propriety of the WPIX license and who is negotiating appropriately retransmission consent for that station. And that issue of who is properly — or who is able to negotiate retransmission consent is squarely at play, both before the FCC and before the Court, based on the plain language of the agreement.

THE COURT: Anything else before I turn to Nexstar?

MS. SESHENS: I think -- your Honor, I think that

covers the gist of what our position is, which I know your

Honor is familiar with from the papers. I think, again, just

to put a finer point on it, the nature of the parties'

arguments here and the disputes that have arisen in this motion

we really think highlight the reason why the primary

jurisdiction doctrine should apply here. Given the nature of

the retransmission consent and licensing issues that

undoubtedly will come into play in this litigation, we think

the doctrine applies and that the prudent course would be to

stay or dismiss without prejudice this case while the FCC

resolves the issues concerning Nexstar's conduct and any

related remedies concerning the ability to negotiate

retransmission consent.

THE COURT: OK. Thank you.

Let me listen to Nexstar.

MR. KAMIN: Thank you, your Honor. It's Mitch Kamin from Covington & Burling, for Nexstar.

It's clear you've absorbed the authority and the arguments in our papers, so I won't belabor any of the points. I'll simply say that we, obviously, concur that this breach of contract issue is squarely before the Court but not before the FCC, and that any suggestion that issues germane to the breach of contract action would be resolved in the FCC proceeding are indeed highly speculative and depend on Comcast's argument that the FCC might take up the petition, it might find Nexstar violated the ownership cap, and it might impose a remedy that affects Nexstar's ability to negotiate for WPIX, and we disagree that any of that is likely to happen. And just as one example, the FCC has no obligation at all to act in response to this informal complaint that Comcast filed last July.

So unless your Honor has questions for me, I would submit on the papers.

 $\,$ THE COURT: The defendant says the FCC has agreed to take up the petition.

MR. KAMIN: I don't think there's any indication that the FCC has agreed to take up the petition, your Honor. The sequence is that the petition was filed last July seeking a declaratory judgment. If the FCC intended to commence

M52HNex0

proceedings on the declaratory judgment, it would open the public docket for public comment, and it has not done that. Instead, in response to a Comcast inquiry concerning whether the ex parte rules would apply to that proceeding in March last month, the FCC sent a letter to Comcast saying that it would consider its petition as an informal complaint.

"Informal complaint" is a very broad category. That includes everything from a consumer who's unhappy with programming on their local television station to an issue such as this. And there's no indication in the record that the FCC intends to act on that informal complaint, nor does it have an obligation to act on that informal complaint, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. Thank you.

Anything else?

MR. KAMIN: Nothing from me, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. I thank the parties. I appreciate the briefs. I appreciate the arguments. I'm prepared to decide.

The plaintiff, Nexstar Media Inc., brought this action against Comcast Cable Communications LLC for breach of contract. The claim arises out of Nexstar's allegations that Comcast did not pay Nexstar certain fees owed by Comcast to Nexstar under an agreement between the parties in connection with television station WPIX.

Shortly prior to Nexstar's initiating this lawsuit,

M52HNex0

Commission (FCC). The petition asks the FCC to find that

Nexstar owned WPIX, in violation of certain FCC rules limiting

ownership of commercial broadcast stations by a single entity,

the ownership cap. Comcast now moves to stay or dismiss this

action pending the resolution of the FCC petition on the

grounds of the primary jurisdiction doctrine or pursuant to the

Court's inherent authority to stay a case.

The following facts are taken from the complaint as well as other sources that the Court may consider on a motion to stay or dismiss on the grounds of the primary jurisdiction doctrine or pursuant to the Court's inherent authority. See Canale v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 258 F.Supp.3d 312, 324, note 11 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). In particular, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of Comcast's FCC petition and of the FCC's decision in In re Application of Tribune Media Co., 19-30, 2019 WL 4440126 (FCC Sept. 13, 2019); see Miller v. DirectV LLC, No. 14 Civ. 7579, 2015 WL 12656912, at note 1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2015); Lyons v. Coxcom, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 1232, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 2009), and of the information contained therein to the extent undisputed.

Comcast is a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD). Nexstar is a television broadcast station group. Nexstar is party to a retransmission consent agreement with Comcast, the retransmission agreement.

Pursuant to that agreement, Comcast is authorized, in exchange for a fee, to offer to Comcast clients Nexstar's programming. The retransmission agreement provides that certain stations not initially covered by the agreement may become covered by the agreement if Nexstar enters into a contract to provide certain services to the station and if Nexstar "is not prohibited from negotiating for retransmission consent on behalf of such stations under FCC rules." The same terms and conditions will apply to such additional stations as stations additionally covered by the agreement.

In 2019, Nexstar sought to acquire the broadcast stations of Tribune Media Company. Transfer of broadcast station licenses requires FCC approval. Because acquiring Tribune's stations would have caused Nexstar to exceed the ownership cap, in order to obtain FCC approval, Nexstar agreed to divest certain stations, including WPIX, to bring Nexstar below the ownership cap. Nexstar represented to the FCC that Nexstar would not be providing ongoing services under sharing agreements to WPIX. The FCC approved these transactions, and the sales were consummated.

Mission Broadcasting, Inc., later sought to acquire WPIX. In seeking approval for this transaction, Mission provided to the FCC a draft of an agreement into which Mission intended to enter with Nexstar regarding WPIX. The agreement would give Nexstar the right to program WPIX, to sell the

station's advertising time, and to receive the station's revenues. The FCC approved Mission's purchase of WPIX. And in December 2020, Mission acquired WPIX, and Mission and Nexstar executed the agreement.

In July 2021, Comcast filed a petition with the FCC. The petition asked the FCC to find that Nexstar's relationship with WPIX constituted ownership for the purposes of the ownership cap, causing Nexstar to be in violation of the ownership cap. Two weeks later Nexstar initiated this action.

Nexstar contends that since December 2020, WPIX has been governed by the retransmission agreement, and that Comcast therefore owes licensing fees to Nexstar that it has not paid. The FCC has not yet rendered a decision on Comcast's petition that Nexstar's relationship with WPIX constituted ownership for purposes of the ownership cap.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Section 1332(a) because Nexstar is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. Comcast is an LLC whose only member is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business also in Pennsylvania. See Bayerische Landesbank v. Aladdin Cap. Mgmt. LLC, 692 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2012). The amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000.

Federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them. *Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States*, 424 U.S. 800, 817

(1976). One exception to that obligation, however, is the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Tassy v. Brunswick Hospital Center, Inc., 296 F.3d 65, 68, note 2 (2d Cir. 2002). The doctrine allows a federal court to refer a matter extending beyond the conventional experience of judges or falling within the realm of administrative discretion to an administrative agency with more specialized experience, expertise, and insight. National Communications Ass'n, Inc. v. American Telephone & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222-23 (2d Cir. 1995). This narrow doctrine should not be applied where the issue at stake is legal in nature and lies within the traditional realm of judicial competence. Goya Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 846 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1988).

In determining whether to apply the doctrine, the threshold question is whether both the court and the agency have jurisdiction over the same issue. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indian V. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1994). If this threshold is met, courts consider four factors: (1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within the agency's particular field of spirit advertise; (2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's discretion; (3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings; and (4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made. Ellis v.

Tribune Television Co., 443 F.3d 71, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2006).

Even if these factors counsel in favor of applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine, courts sometimes refuse to apply the doctrine where it would cause undue judicial delay, although the continuing validity of this practice has been called into question. See Id. at 90.

Nexstar's claim in this case is that Comcast breached the retransmission agreement by failing to pay fees to Nexstar for Comcast's retransmission of WPIX. Comcast's defense is that Nexstar is not entitled to any such fees because the language of the retransmission agreement does not create any obligations by Comcast with respect to television stations on whose behalf Nexstar is "prohibited from negotiating for retransmission consent on behalf of such station under FCC rules."

"owns" WPIX under the FCC rules and that Nexstar there by violates the ownership cap. In the current motion, Comcast argues that if the FCC finds that Nexstar violates the ownership cap, Nexstar is "prohibited from negotiating for retransmission consent on behalf of" WPIX under the FCC rules within the meaning of the retransmission agreement. Thus, according to Comcast, Nexstar's claim hinges on the FCC's resolution of the question whether Nexstar "owns" WPIX and thereby violates the ownership cap.

However, it does not follow from a finding that

Nexstar violates the ownership cap, if any such finding is ever

made, that Nexstar is thereby "prohibited from negotiating for

retransmission consent on behalf of WPIX under FCC's rules."

Comcast cites no case, statute, or regulation that so holds.

Indeed, Comcast does not dispute that if Nexstar does, in fact,

exceed the ownership cap, Nexstar could cure that violation by,

for example, divesting stations other than WPIX within two

years. See 47 CFR Section 73.3555(e)(3).

Nexstar has failed to show that if Nexstar violates the ownership cap, Nexstar is "prohibited from negotiating for retransmission consent on behalf of" WPIX under FCC's rules. Accordingly, the question whether Nexstar "owns" WPIX, in violation of the ownership cap, has no bearing on whether Comcast has violated the retransmission agreement in connection with WPIX, and the Court need not in this case make a finding as to whether Nexstar "owns" WPIX in violation of the ownership cap.

The primary jurisdiction doctrine should not be applied to this case. This is a straightforward contract case. The main issue, as explained by the parties, is whether Comcast violated its contract with Nexstar by failing to pay Nexstar for Nexstar's negotiations on behalf of WPIX. The answer to that question does not turn on the ownership rules, but rather the negotiations rules, which prohibit the coordination of

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negotiations between two stations if the stations exist in the same market unless such stations are under common control. See 47 CFR 76.65(b)(1)(viii). While the FCC could make that determination, there is no showing that the application of that rule depends on agency discretion or expertise. The application of the relevant primary jurisdiction factors argue against dismissing or staying the case while the issue is presented, if ever, to the FCC.

As to the first and second factors, the issues in this case fall squarely within the Court's competence and do not implicate the FCC's discretion. The question whether Nexstar owns WPIX in violation of the ownership cap has no bearing on whether Nexstar is "prohibited from negotiate for the government retransmission consent on behalf of "WPIX under the FCC's rules. The issues highlighted by Comcast as areas particularly within the FCC's competence or discretion relate to the application of the FCC's rules governing ownership of commercial broadcast stations. Because those rules have no bearing on the contract dispute in this case, Comcast has identified no question presented in this case that implicates technical or policy considerations within the FCC's particular field of expertise, see National Communications, 46 F.3d at 223, or the FCC's discretion, Ellis, 443 F.3d at 85-86. To the contrary, the issues actually presented in this case fall readily within the competence of this court. The case presents

M52HNexO

mainly standard contract issues. See New York State Thruway

Authority v. Level 3 Communications, LLC, 734 F.Supp.2d 257,

265 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). The only issues that go beyond standard

contract issues are readily within this court's competence and

implicate no FCC discretion.

While the breach of contract claim hinges in part on whether Nexstar is "prohibited from negotiation for retransmission consent on behalf of" WPIX under the FCC's rules, the only FCC rule identified by either party that pertains to whether Nexstar "may negotiation for retransmission consent on behalf of" WPIX is 47 CFR Section 76.65(b)(1)(viii). The only issue relevant to the contract dispute in this case that is presented by this rule is whether Nexstar owns a television broadcast station in the same local market as WPIX. That issue is a discrete factual issue that this court is readily capable of answering.

The issue, moreover, does not implicate the FCC's discretion given that the relevant rule is clear-cut and was required by Congress. See 47 U.S.C. Section 325(b)(3)(C)(iv) directing the FCC to implement regulations "prohibiting a television broadcast station from coordinating negotiations or negotiating on a joint basis with another television broadcast station in the same local market to grant retransmission consent under this section to" an MVPD. The first and second factors, therefore, weigh against abstention.

Likewise, there is no danger of inconsistent adjudications. The issue currently before the FCC is whether Nexstar's relationship to WPIX constitutes ownership and therefore violates the ownership cap. This issue bears no relation to the contract dispute in this case, and the Court will therefore have no reason to resolve it. Accordingly, there is no risk of inconsistent rulings on this point, and the third factor therefore weighs against abstention.

The fourth factor, whether a prior application to the agency has been made, does not support primary jurisdiction in this case. Comcast has filed a petition with the FCC, but that petition does not implicate directly the negotiation rule, and that petition does not ask the FCC to answer the particular questions that will need to be resolved in this case.

Therefore, the relevant factors weigh against application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

Considerations of judicial economy also weigh against application of the primary — of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Neither party contends that referral of this case to the FCC would result in a quicker resolution. The Court, therefore, will not dismiss or stay this case based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

Comcast asks the Court, in the alternative, to stay
the case pending the resolution of Comcast's FCC petition
pursuant to the Court's inherent authority. While the Court

has the discretion to do so, a stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review, *Gojo Industries*, *Inc.* v. *Innovative Biodefense*, *Inc.*, 407 F.Supp.3d 356, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Accordingly, the party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an excess of the Court's discretion. *Id.* at 362.

In considering whether to exercise this discretion, courts consider (1) the private interests of the nonmovant in proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation as balanced against the prejudice to the nonmovant if delayed, (2) the private interests of and burden on the movant, (3) the interests of the courts, (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation, and (5) the public interest. In this case, Comcast has not made the requisite showing. For the reasons explained above, the outcome of the FCC proceeding will not affect the outcome of this case.

The second factor, the burden on Comcast caused by requiring it to continue litigating this proceeding is negligible because this contract dispute will have to be resolved, and it will not be resolved in the current FCC proceeding. By the same token, while Comcast argues that Comcast may need to implead or obtain discovery from Mission, because the current FCC proceeding will not resolve the issue in this case, staying the case would only delay the involvement of Mission.

The fourth factor also does not weigh in favor of a
stay. The first and third factors weigh against a stay because
Nexstar has an interest in obtaining relief if it is entitled
to relief, and the Court has an interest in advancing these
proceedings. And Comcast fails to articulate any public
interest that would be served by delaying these proceedings
which seeks to resolve a private dispute between two
sophisticated parties. Accordingly, the Court will not
exercise its discretion to stay the case.

The Court has considered all of the arguments of the parties. To the extent not addressed above, the arguments are either moot or without merit for the forgoing reasons. The motion to dismiss or to stay this case is denied.

The clerk is directed to close docket Nos. 18 and 23. So ordered.

OK. So now it's time for a scheduling order. I'm just looking over the docket sheet. Has there been an answer?

MS. SESHENS: Not yet, your Honor. This is Dana Seshens.

THE COURT: OK. So 14 days to answer or so?

MS. SESHENS: That would be fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't we say Comcast will answer by May 20. The parties should submit a Rule 26(f) report by June 3.

How long do the parties think for discovery in this

case? I know you're going to have a --

MR. KAMIN: I apologize.

THE COURT: Thank you. No, no, it's OK. It's a difficulty of holding a conference by telephone. You're both very polite, and I appreciate it, and no one was trying to cut me off.

So any estimates with respect to time for discovery?

I was going to say I appreciate that the answer to that

question may turn on your conference under Rule 26, but go

ahead.

MR. KAMIN: Thank you, your Honor. Mitch Kamin, for Nexstar.

I do think it will in part turn on the conference, but we believe an expedited discovery schedule makes sense given the narrow scope of the contract issue in this case and the limited amount of discovery that should be necessary here.

MS. SESHENS: Your Honor, this is Dana Seshens again.

I agree with Mr. Kamin that at least in part the duration will depend on the conference, and we're happy to confer about this as part of the Rule 26(f) process. But there, obviously, will be, from our perspective, very likely implications for Mission and additional potential claims here that are related. So that may complicate the schedule just a bit. And if Mr. Kamin has no objection, I think we can confer about the duration and come to a reasonable schedule, but happy

to take guidance from the Court on that as we sit here now.

THE COURT: No, that's great. I mean, I encourage the parties to arrive at a reasonable schedule if, in fact, there is a third-party complaint against Mission. Is that what Comcast is contemplating?

MS. SESHENS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: You don't have to commit yourself. Well, if that's true, I have to give time for Mission to respond to the third-party complaint, and Mission should be part of the Rule 26(f) conference. So if there is a third-party complaint against Mission, the parties should send me a letter and delay the transmission -- delay the filing of the 26(f) report for a short time to allow Mission to participate in the Rule 26 conference and submit a joint 26(f) report.

How much time is necessary for discovery in this case?

I wouldn't think that you'd need more than 90 days for discovery, but I'm certainly not on top of what the scope of the discovery would be in the case.

MS. SESHENS: Your Honor, one point I might add, just in the interest of transparency as we're talking about the potential landscape for this case, is there also could be a counterclaim against Nexstar to which it will have to answer or, if it so chooses, move. It would obviously be up to Nexstar to decide, but just as we think about the full range or full scope of what the case could look like, that is on the

M52HNexO

table as well. And so didn't want that to come as a surprise to your Honor if the schedule winds up needing to incorporate some time for that as well. THE COURT: No, no, that's fine. Sure, no problem. OK. Anything else that we could do today? MR. KAMIN: Nothing further from the plaintiff, your Honor. Thank you. MS. SESHENS: And nothing further from the defendant either. Thank you for your time, your Honor. THE COURT: OK. Thank you all. Great. Bye now. (Adjourned)